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Abstract—Android security and privacy research has boomed
in recent years, far outstripping investigations of other appified
platforms. However, despite this attention, research efforts are
fragmented and lack any coherent evaluation framework. We
present a systematization of Android security and privacy re-
search with a focus on the appification of software systems. To put
Android security and privacy research into context, we compare
the concept of appification with conventional operating system
and software ecosystems. While appification has improved some
issues (e.g., market access and usability), it has also introduced a
whole range of new problems and aggravated some problems
of the old ecosystems (e.g., coarse and unclear policy, poor
software development practices). Some of our key findings are
that contemporary research frequently stays on the beaten path
instead of following unconventional and often promising new
routes. Many security and privacy proposals focus entirely on the
Android OS and do not take advantage of the unique features and
actors of an appified ecosystem, which could be used to roll out
new security mechanisms less disruptively. Our work highlights
areas that have received the larger shares of attention, which
attacker models were addressed, who is the target, and who has
the capabilities and incentives to implement the countermeasures.
We conclude with lessons learned from comparing the appified
with the old world, shedding light on missed opportunities and
proposing directions for future research.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last couple of years, the appification of software
has drastically changed the way software is produced and con-
sumed and how users interact with computer devices. With the
rise of web and mobile applications, the number of apps with
a highly specialized, tiny feature set drastically increased. In
appified ecosystems, there is an app for almost everything, and
the market entrance barrier is low, attracting many (sometimes
unprofessional) developers. Apps are encouraged to share
features through inter-component communication, while risks
are communicated to users via permission dialogs. Based on
the large body of research available for Android as the pioneer
of open source appified ecosystems, we center this paper’s
scope on Android security and privacy research. This choice
allows us to focus on the dominant appified ecosystem with a
large real-world deployment: Android.
Motivation for a Systematization of Android/Appification
Security. The large body of literature uncovered a myriad of
appification-specific security and privacy challenges as well
as countermeasures to face these new threats. As with all new
fields of endeavor, there is no unified approach to research. As
a consequence, efforts over the last half decade necessarily
pioneered ways to examine and harden these systems. A
problem with this approach is that there are lots of fragmented
efforts to improve security and privacy in an appified platform,
but no unified framework or understanding of the ecosystem as
a whole. Therefore, we believe that it is time to systematize the
research work on security and privacy in appified platforms,
to offer a basis for more systematic future research.
Challenges and Methodology of the Systematization. While
the fragmentation of the Android security research is our
main motivation, it is at the same time our biggest challenge.
Contributions to this research field have been made in many
different areas, such as static code analysis, access control
frameworks and policies, and usable security for end users as
well as app and platform developers. To objectively evaluate
and compare the different approaches, our first step will be to
create a common understanding of the different security and
privacy challenges and a universal attacker model to express
these threats. Security solutions are by default designed with
a very specific attacker model in mind. We found that in
most Android research, this attacker model has been only
implicitly expressed. However, to understand the role of a
(new) approach within the context of Android’s appified
ecosystem, it is also important to understand which attacker
capabilities it does not cover and how different approaches
can complement each other. By studying the evaluation details
of many representative approaches from the literature, we
create a unified understanding of attacker capabilities. This
forms the basis for analyzing the security benefits of different
solutions and lays the groundwork for comparing approaches
with respect to their role in the overall ecosystem.
One insight from our analysis of the challenges in Android’s
appified ecosystem, is that some security issues are new and
unique to Android, as caused by the appification paradigm
or the result of design decisions of its architects. Other well-
known problems are aggravated by appification, while many
security issues are lessened or solved by the appification
paradigm. Such understanding is key to transcending Android
to develop a broader picture of the future of software systems
and the environments they will be placed in.
In particular, the tight integration of many non-traditional
actors in the appified ecosystem creates interesting problems
as well as opportunities. Platform developers, device vendors,
app markets, library providers, app developers, app publishers,
toolchain providers and end users all have different capabilities
and incentives to contribute (in)securely to the ecosystem. Our
systematization makes the important contribution of showing
how previous research has interacted with these actors, iden-
tifying contributing factors to our research community’s work
creating a real-world impact.
Based on our systematization of this knowledge, we draw
lessons learned from our community’s security research that
provide important insights into the design and implementation
of current and future appified software platforms. We also
create an overview of which areas have received focused
attention and point out areas where research went astray.
Finally, we address underrepresented areas that could benefit
from or require further analysis and effort.
Please note that we are not discussing plausible problems
and benefits of research solutions for adoption by Google or
other vendors. Such factors can be manifold, such as technical
reasons (e.g., backwards compatibility), business decisions
(e.g., interference with advertisement networks), protection
of app developers (e.g., intrusion of application sandboxes),
or usability aspects. However, without concrete first-hand
knowledge, any such discussion would merely result in spec-
ulation, which we do not consider a tangible contribution of
a systematization of knowledge.
Systematization Methodology
There is a huge body of research work on Android security
with (conservatively) over 100 papers published. Since we
aim to systematize this research as opposed to offering a
complete survey [1], we extracted key aspects and key papers
to create a foundation for our systematization. The focus of
our systematization is on security issues and challenges in
the context of appification and the app market ecosystem. We
include both offensive works (i. e. papers that uncovered new
security issues or classes of attacks) as well as defensive ones
(i. e. papers that focus on countermeasures or new security
frameworks). However, we do not focus on malware on appi-
fied platforms, as this has been dealt with in prior work [2].
We also exclude hardware-specific or other low level problems
on mobile platforms, such as CPU side-channels, differential
power analysis, or base-band attacks, which are independent
from appification.
We selected the research based on the following criteria:
• Unique/Pioneering—Security issues which are unique to
the Android ecosystem, i.e. never been seen before.
• Aggravated—Security issues which have greater impact
on an appified ecosystem than on traditional computing.
• Attention—Research on aspects that received more atten-
tion (i. e. many papers dealt with this specific aspect or
the papers received high citation counts).
• Impact—Security research that affected a large number
of users (or devices).
• Scope—Security issues which involve a large fraction of
the appified world’s actors. We include these issues since
they are particularly hard to fix.
• Open Challenges—Research worked on issues or coun-
termeasures that remain “unfinished” and highlight inter-
esting and important areas of future work.
In the following, we systematize the research using the
above rubric, extract a unified attacker model and evaluate the
work both in terms of content and also on its placement within
the Android ecosystem. We identify actors that are responsible
for the problems, would benefit from solutions, and/or have the
capability to implement and deploy them.
II. PROBLEM AND RESEARCH AREAS
To identify important problem and research areas, we com-
pare aspects of traditional software ecosystems with appified
platforms, mainly focusing on Android.
A. Conventional Software Ecosystem vs. Appified Platform
(Android)
We start our systematization by categorizing and summariz-
ing key security challenges and issues that have been identified
in the literature in both conventional software ecosystems and
the appified world. Our intention for systematizing the key
security challenges is to provide a systematic approach to help
security researchers understand the (old and new) challenges
that have been identified and to lay the foundation for a
discourse on addressing these challenges.
1) Defining the Access to Resources: Controlling access
to resources on a computer system requires 1) accurate def-
inition of the security principals and protected resources in
the system; 2) a non-bypassable and tamper-proof validation
mechanism for any access (reference monitor); and 3) a sound
security policy that governs, for all requested accesses in any
system state, whether access is allowed or should be denied.
Android deviates from conventional OSes in all three aspects:
a) System Security Principals: Conventional systems are
primarily designed as multi-user systems with human users
that have processes executing on their behalf. A small number
of dedicated user IDs is assigned to system daemons and
services that do not execute on behalf of a human user.
Appified security models build on the classic multi-user
system: not only is the human user of the system considered a
principal, but in fact all app developers that have their app(s)
installed on the system are considered as security principals.
Developers are represented by their app, which receives a
distinct user ID (UID), exactly like the pre-installed system
apps receive a UID. In recent Android versions with multi-
(human)-user support, the traditional UID scheme is further
extended: the UID is now a two-dimensional matrix that
identifies the combination of the app UID (i.e., developer) and
human user ID under which the app is currently running.
b) Implementation of the Reference Monitor: Conven-
tionally, reference monitoring is typically managed by the OS,
e.g., the file system and network stack, so that user processes
can build their access control on top.
Appified ecosystems also use the OS for low-level access
control. However, the extensive application frameworks on
top of which apps are deployed provide a different interface:
following the paradigm of IPC-based privilege separation
and compartmentalization in classical high assurance systems,
security- and privacy-critical functionality is consolidated into
dedicated user-space processes. Exposed IPC interfaces en-
force access control on calling processes.
2
c) Security Policy: In conventional software systems,
multiple privilege level(s) for a process are defined: Processes
can run as superuser (root), system services, with normal
user privileges, guest privileges, and so on. All processes
running under a certain privilege level share the same set of
permissions and may access the same set of resources.
Modern appified ecosystems make a clearer distinction
between system and third-party apps: Direct access to security-
and privacy-sensitive resources (e.g., driver interfaces or
databases) is only permitted to selected applications and
daemons of the application framework. This policy is imple-
mented, as in the conventional platforms, in the OS access con-
trol policies (i.e., discretionary and mandatory access control).
However, system apps may request access to permissions that
are not available to third-party apps. Third-party apps have by
default no permissions set, but may request their permissions
from a set commonly available to all third-party apps.
2) Sharing Functionalities: In conventional operating sys-
tems, third-party apps are usually self-contained and heavily
used to incorporate external functionalities as libraries (e.g.
the OpenSSL library to make TLS available in a program).
In addition to third-party libraries, in the appified world,
apps also share functionality through inter-component com-
munication (ICC), i.e., by providing a Service that can be
accessed through Intents or persistent IPC connections. ICC is
heavily used to access system apps such as the map, phone, or
Play app, but also popular third-party services, e.g., as offered
by the Facebook and Twitter apps.
3) Software Distribution: Conventionally, software is dis-
tributed in a decentralized way: It can be downloaded from
websites, purchased in online stores or shipped on physical
media such as USB sticks or CDs. Software comes either
in compiled binaries or, in case of open source software, as
source code that needs to be compiled before installation.
Appified ecosystems often make use of centralized stores
that distribute software/apps. These app stores allow devel-
opers to upload and distribute their software in a highly
organized way. The app markets provide search, feedback and
review interfaces for users and allow for centralized security
mechanisms that can be enforced by the markets directly.
We distinguish between commercial app markets such as
Google Play and central software repositories that are widely
used in different Linux distributions. In addition to simply
distributing software by streamlining the process of searching
and installing apps, commercial app markets have additional
responsibilities such as billing, DRM (e.g., forward locking on
Android) and in-app purchasing.
4) Software Engineering:
a) Development Process: Previously, single developers/-
companies developed software and in many cases distributed
it themselves. They followed agreed-on rules (e.g., IDE,
libraries, or frameworks to use) and could outsource in a
regulated way to contracted (sub-)companies. In appified
ecosystems, a chain of actors is responsible for the distribution
of software, which is much more loosely coupled than the
more stringent traditional development chains: The original
developer, (often) a publisher, and increasingly development
frameworks are involved.
b) Programming Environment: In conventional operating
systems, developers can choose what programming language
they want to use (within the design space that the project leaves
them), and a wide range of programming languages and frame-
works are usually available to implement software. Appified
ecosystems dictate programming languages and frameworks
to enforce compatibility with their application framework and
hence robustness of the deployed applications. Android devel-
opers, for instance, are required to use Java and the Android
SDK/NDK. App creators play a crucial role in modern appified
ecosystems: They provide easy-to-use clickable interfaces to
produce software that can be run on multiple platforms.
5) Present Classes of Programming Errors: Programming
errors, such as logic errors and run-time errors, are the
dominant sources of software vulnerabilities in conventional
software ecosystems. While recent years have demonstrated
that they are also present in mobile platforms with the same
devastating effects, the API-dependent design of apps has
introduced a new range of problems into the appified world
as a direct consequence of misuse of programming APIs of
the surrounding application framework. This differs from the
traditional ecosystem, where this class of errors is limited
mostly to library APIs, since the application framework API
is a necessity to make apps operational.
6) Webification: In conventional software ecosystems, soft-
ware is mainly self-contained and its primary functionality
does not depend on the availability of remote resources such
as web services. The appification paradigm has seen a shift
towards increasingly web service-oriented architectures that
depend on server backends to provide their promised function-
ality. At the end of the spectrum are apps that consist merely
of a webview component that appears to be local app logic,
but in fact is not much more than a restricted web browser for
the service’s backend web servers.
7) Software Update Mechanisms: Conventional OS updates
are centrally organized, while the updating process for third-
party software takes, in contrast, a greater effort: Every
program needs to be updated (and hence, often started and
restarted) separately. Only systems with a central software
distribution channel improve on this situation (e.g., Linux
distributions). The situation for updates in appified ecosystems
is currently the exact opposite. Fragmentation is a huge issue
in appified ecosystems, such as Android, and impedes the
OS update process. As many different network providers and
device vendors customize parts of the operating system, they
need to manage OS updates on their own, resulting in lengthy
and complicated update procedures. As a result, many Android
devices do not receive OS updates at all. In contrast, app
updates are straightforward and fast, as centralized app stores
push updates immediately to their users.
III. ANDROID/APPIFIED ECOSYSTEM
As an example for appification, we provide an overview of
the Android ecosystem, the actors involved and their impact
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on the ecosystem’s overall security. We use Figure 1 as our
reference to introduce the actors and their interaction patterns.
A. Ecosystem Overview
At the core of appification ecosystems are the app develop-
ers, producing the millions of apps available for the end users.
The number of Android app developers is vastly larger than
for the traditional desktop software ecosystem. For instance,
in the current Play market1 roughly 460,000 distinct developer
accounts have published applications, where an account can
also belong to an entire company or team of developers.
These app developers rely on the rich APIs of the platform
SDK, which is provided by the platform developers. These
APIs provide access to core functionalities (e.g., telephony,
connectivity and sensors like accelerometers) as well as to user
data (e.g., contact management, messaging, picture gallery).
Developers can request access to those functionalities by
requesting permissions in their app’s manifest file (e.g. the
CONTACTS permissions grants access to the user’s address
book). End users are presented permission dialogs at install
time. Those dialogs present all the permissions previously
requested by a developer and inform users about an app’s
resource access. Since version 6 (Marshmallow), Android
also introduced, like iOS has done several iterations before,
the concept of dynamic permissions: a small subset of all
permissions are granted by the user at runtime when an app
requests access to protected interfaces instead of statically
at install time, and those selected permissions can also be
revoked again by the user. It is also possible for developers
to define custom permissions that can grant access to their
app’s functionality to other apps written by the same developer,
system apps, or all apps installed on the device.
Android apps are composed of Java code (compiled to
bytecode format for the CPUs of mobile platforms) and of
native code in the form of C/C++ shared libraries. Library
providers such as advertisement networks support develop-
ers in creating ad-supported apps by offering dedicated ad
libraries that apps can rely on, thus firmly integrating the ad
library in the final application package. Many apps connect
to web-services (e.g., cloud-based services or other backends)
and use web-technologies such as HTML, CSS and Javascript.
This move to web apps is typical for the appification paradigm.
Typically for the shift to appification is the way monetiza-
tion works: App developers can sell their apps to end users for
fixed one-time prices (using central app stores such as Google
Play), they can collaborate with advertisement networks by
displaying advertisements in their apps and receiving shares of
the advertisement revenues, or they can offer in-app purchases,
e.g., users can buy additional features of the app. Those
options are not mutually exclusive, but conventionally paid
apps refrain from displaying ads. Together they lower the
economic burden on developers and streamline the process
of purchasing and installing apps for end users [3].
Unlike other current appified ecosystems, Android allows
(and actually encourages) inter-component communication
1Approximately 1.5 million free apps crawled in February 2016.
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(ICC), which prompts developers to divide their apps into
smaller parts (e.g., plugins) and allows them to act as service
providers (e.g., Facebook app, Play app, etc.). Technically, ICC
is based on the Linux kernel’s inter-process communication—
primarily via a new IPC mechanism called Binder. However,
since logical communication occurs between application com-
ponents such as databases, user interfaces, and services, this
Android-specific IPC has been coined as Inter-Component
Communication in the literature [4].
B. Involved Actors
Software ecosystems involve a number of actors that each
have their own rights and duties, which differ between appified
and conventional ecosystems in some aspects. We differentiate
these actors as groups of ecosystem participants, describe
their primary task(s), their power to influence the security and
privacy of the ecosystem with their decisions, and then give
concrete examples of each class of actors. Table I illustrates
the different actors, their influence on the ecosystem’s security
and privacy, and their interaction with each other.
Although feedback loops can be established between any
number of actors, in the following discussion we focus on the
potential direct impact of a security decision made by one user
on all other actors. We do not consider indirect impact, e.g.,
when users protest against or boycott certain apps and thus
force app or platform developers to react.
1) Platform Developers: Platform developers are responsi-
ble for providing the Android Open Source Platform (AOSP).
They make basic system and security decisions and all other
actors build on their secure paradigms. Library providers and
app developers are bound to the provided SDK, and app mar-
kets have to rely on Android’s open approach (instead of, for
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Fig. 1. The Android ecosystem: Actors and their impact on the ecosystem’s security.
example, Apple’s walled-garden ecosystem). An exception is
that device vendors can implement their own security decisions
and need not adhere to Android’s paradigms. In reality, though,
they mostly build upon the provided foundations.
2) Device Vendors: Device vendors adopt the AOSP and
customize it for their different needs. A variety of device
vendors currently share the market for mobile devices using
Android [5]. Besides adaptation of the basic Android soft-
ware stack to the vendor-specific hardware platforms, vendors
customize in order to distinguish their Android device from
their competitors’. Thus, many versions of vendor-specific
apps and modified versions of Android’s original user in-
terface are being distributed with Android-based platforms.
The impact of device vendors on the ecosystem’s security
is significant: Although, naturally, their customizations only
affect their customers, this user-base can be large in case
of big vendors such as Samsung or HTC. Device vendors
can adopt security decisions from the platform developers
or add their own solutions (cf. Samsung KNOX [6]) on
which library and app developers can build. However, device
vendors cannot change the way apps are published in markets,
which is why their impact on publishers and markets is very
limited—e.g. they could not enforce CA-signed instead of self-
signed certificates for app signing practices without breaking
Android’s guidelines.
3) Library Providers: Based on the platform’s API, library
providers build their own APIs to offer new features such as
ad services or to make the use of (possibly unnecessarily)
complicated platform APIs easier for app developers. Libraries
exist for UI components (they can but need not be attached to
network tasks) as well as for ads or crash reports. Library
developers have the power to make all apps that include
them either more or less secure. Library developers suffer or
benefit from security decisions made by platform developers
and device vendors. However, their decisions do not affect the
platform security in general. Their positive/negative security
decisions propagate to app developers who choose to use their
libraries—they can, for example, wrap badly designed pro-
gramming interfaces from platform developers. Their decisions
affect neither app publishers nor markets directly. Typically,
library providers offer ad services, networking features or app
usage evaluation features.
4) App Developers: App developers write apps using the
APIs defined by platform developers and of those libraries
they choose to include. They can opt to write code themselves
or use existing third-party code. In theory, they can make
essential contributions to security. In practice, they make
unsafe choices and implement features in the least laborious
way, which is frequently not the most secure choice.
While app developers can break secure default interfaces
provided by platform developers/device vendors (e.g. crypto
primitive API misuse), this has no effect on the platform
security in general. Their decisions neither affect app pub-
lishers nor markets directly. Still, app developers may impact
libraries’ security (e.g. as fraud is a frequently evaluated issue).
5) Toolchain Providers: Toolchain providers offer helpful
tools for app developers (e.g. the Eclipse ADT for Android
app development). They can implement many analysis tools
that help discover API misuse. Toolchain providers can fix
some weaknesses introduced by platform providers and device
vendors (e.g. confusing permission descriptions, or hard-to-use
APIs). All app developers and their users benefit/suffer from
good/bad toolchain provider support.
6) App Publishers: App publishers are professional service
providers that help developers publish their apps to certain
markets. They receive either binary or source code, add certain
properties like ads, and distribute the app to one or more app
markets. In theory, they can run preliminary analyses on the
code and report or fix bugs, as well as filter malware. If app
signing is delegated to the app publishers, they could also
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surreptitiously insert malicious code. Several app publishers
maintain substantial numbers of apps [7] and thereby may sub-
stantially impact markets’ security. Hence, a single publisher’s
impact on the ecosystem’s security is rather impressive.
7) App Markets: App markets—Google Play is the most
popular one—distribute apps from developers to the end users.
Users as well as app developers rely on them to make sure that
the apps are distributed in a consistent, unchanged, reliable,
and benign way. In theory, app markets have the potential
to find not only malware, but also buggy and unsafe code.
To do this, they can apply various kinds of security analyses
techniques—such as static or dynamic code analysis—on all
apps they distribute. For example, Google Play runs suppos-
edly multiple tests on apps prior to distribution, including
static/dynamic analysis and machine learning [8]. However,
they do not run deeper checks to detect dangerous misuse of
the Android API. No app market runs (theoretically possible)
runtime tests, nor do they exclude apps signed with the same
key corresponding to different developers.
8) Users: Users are app consumers in the ecosystem. They
can make the decision to install (non-pre-installed) apps, and
have to confirm the permissions that apps request. They are
the most likely target of attacks. In theory, they can make safe
choices, as well as choose not to use important credentials.
However, a single user’s impact on the ecosystem’s security is
negligible. Users as a group have to rely on security decisions
made by all other actors in the ecosystem.
C. Global Attacker Model
We provide a taxonomy for attacker capabilities on An-
droid. This taxonomy reflects the threat models we extracted
during our systematization in Section IV and helps to later on
compare proposed countermeasures.
When considering the attacker capabilities, we had the
options to order them across capability categories or within
categories. We decided to order them within categories, since
our categories depend on too many distinct factors to be
comparable and since we base our systematization on those
categories. For instance, a user connecting frequently to public
Wi-Fi access points is susceptible to network attacks, but this
behavior does not influence other capability categories like,
e.g., piggybacking apps. We order the attacker capabilities
vertically, i.e., we rate the power of attackers in specific
capability categories. We use the following semantics to note
attacker capabilities in each category: Solid circles ( ) denote
strong capabilities corresponding to a weak attacker model.
Half-filled circles ( ) denote common attacker capabilities,
while hollow circles ( ) describe the absence of any capability
in the category, strengthening the attacker model.
Next, we introduce our categories for attacker capabilities,
informally define the exact capabilities attackers may have in
each category, and explain our ordering of those capabilities.
C1—Dangerous permissions: The attacker has code run-
ning on the victim device, which has been granted dangerous
permissions ( ) that give access to privacy sensitive user data
or control over the device that can negatively impact the user.
Dangerous permissions must be explicitly granted by the user
during app installation. We assume normal permissions ( )
when the attacker has been granted only permissions that are
of lower risk and automatically granted by the system.
C2—Multiple apps: Attacker-controlled apps are running
on the user device. Full capability indicates that the attacker
has two or more apps running on the victim device ( ). This
would enable collusion attacks via overt and covert channels.
Half-capability ( ) means that only one attacker-controlled app
is running on the device. In general, the capability of having at
least one app on the user device enables the attacker to engage
in ICC with other apps on the device or to scan the local file
system to the extent the attacker-controlled apps’ permissions
allow this.
C3—Piggybacking apps: The attacker re-packages other
apps and is able to modify the existing code or include new
code ( ). A limited piggybacking capability ( ) is assumed if
the attacker provides code that is intentionally loaded by app
developers into their apps (e.g., libraries). Limited piggyback-
ing is assumed to be the weaker capability, because libraries
used by developers are hosted by the app (i.e., share the host
sandbox) limiting the attacker to the host app’s permissions.
In contrast, re-packaging apps allows the attacker to request
more permissions for the repackaged app.
C4—Native code: The attacker has an app containing native
code, i.e., shared libraries. This requires having at least one
app on the device under control (C2. ). Native code that
implements exploit payload, native programs, or zipper/crypto
routines for obfuscation are considered as full capability ( ).
Non-exploit code that still provides the means to modify
the app’s memory space is assumed as half-capability ( ).
Although Android’s design permits all apps to contain native
code, there are apps that contain none ( ).
C5—Dynamic code loading: The attacker is able to dy-
namically load code at run-time ( ) into an app (e.g., using
the Java reflection API). This requires having at least one
app on the device under control (C2. ). Half-capability ( )
is assumed if the attacker can inject code into another, benign
but insecure app. Dynamic code loading is assumed to be a
stronger capability than code injection, since dynamic loading
allows the attacker to use obfuscation techniques to execute
the attack surreptitiously.
C6—Network attacks: The attacker is capable of mod-
ifying/interrupting/forging the Wi-Fi and cellular network
communication of the end user device ( ). We assume a
passive attacker ( ) if the attacker is only able to eavesdrop
on the communication. Technically, a network attack can be
accomplished as in traditional attacker models by, e.g., setting
up a rogue access point or base station. On Android, an
attacker can gain the same capability through a malicious VPN
app, through which all network traffic of all processes is routed
when it is activated by the user. This requires at least C2. .
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TABLE III
CATEGORIZATION OF PROPOSED ANDROID SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES, THEIR POTENTIAL IMPLEMENTERS, AND THEIR ADDRESSED ATTACKER
MODEL.
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C
5.
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C
6.
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s
Permission evolution
(Section IV-A)
System Security Extension
Kirin [17]
TaintDroid [54]
Apex [55]
Sorbet [21]
QUIRE [56]
IPC Inspection [20]
XManDroid [57]
SDK / Tool-chain Extension
Stowaway [13]
PScout [14]
Curbing Permissions [58]
HCI Modifications
Decision making process [59]
Using personal information [60]
(Meta) Data Analysis
WHYPER [61]
AutoCog [62]
DescribeMe [63]
User study Permissions remystified [64]
Permission revolution
(Section IV-B)
System Security Extension
Saint [65]
CRePE [66]
TISSA [67]
SE Android [68]
TrustDroid [69]
FlaskDroid [70]
ASM [71] ( )‡ ( )‡ ( )‡ ( )‡ ( )‡
Compac [72]
AdDroid [27]
AdSplit [73]
LayerCake [74]
Binary modifications
Aurasium [75]
Dr. Android,Mr. Hide [76]
I-ARM Droid [77]
AppGuard [78]
Boxify [79]
Webification
(Section IV-C)
System Security Extensions Morbs [35]
SDK / Tool-chain Modification
NoFrak [34]
NoInjection [38]
Programming-induced leakage
(Section IV-D)
SDK / Tool-chain Extension
MalloDroid [40]
CryptoLint [43]
SSL API Redesign [42]
App Analysis
SMV-Hunter [41]
CHEX [22]
SCanDroid [80]
AndroidLeaks [81]
FlowDroid [82]
Software Distribution
(Section IV-E)
Market solution
Meteor [83]
MAST [84]
Application Transparency [7]
(Meta) Data Analysis
DroidRanger [32]
DNADroid [49]
RiskRanker [85]
CHABADA [86]
Collaborative Verification [87]
MassVet [88]
SDK / Tool-chain Extension AppInk [89]
Software Update Mechanism (Section IV-G) (Meta) Data Analysis SecUp [51] ( )†
= actor must implement solution/attacker capability fully addressed; = actor should/can participate in solution/attacker capability partially addressed
= actor not involved/attacker capability not addressed.
† Requests sensitive permissions and attributes defined by a future Android OS version; ‡ Depends on loaded security module
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IV. SYSTEMATIZATION OF RESEARCH AREAS IN APPIFIED
ECOSYSTEMS
Building on the differences between conventional and appi-
fied ecosystems as well as the actor and global threat model
of the Android ecosystem, we now identify fields of research
that we think need to be systematized, considering a number
of representative research papers for each field. We discuss
challenges in the respective fields, regarding the global actor
model, identifying the involved actors, their respective roles
in causing a specific problem and their potential in resolving
it. Referring to the global threat model, we summarize the
attacker capabilities assumed in the threat models required
to exploit the problem areas. Moreover, we present selected,
representative Android security countermeasures if available.
We do not claim that our systematization is all-encompassing,
nor that it includes all problem fields ever identified for
Android nor all countermeasures to known problems; however,
we took great care to choose a representative selection (see
Section I).
A. Permission Evolution
The concept of permission-based access control for priv-
ileged resources is one of the cornerstones of Android’s
security design and has received a lot of attention by the
security research community.
1) Challenges: We sub-categorize the identified problems
and challenges according to the most affected actors in the
ecosystem: the end users and app developers.
a) Permission Comprehension and Attention by End
Users: To effectively inform end users about the privacy
risks that an app imposes, it is imperative that end users
are capable of correctly perceiving the risk of granting the
access rights requested by apps. Pioneering work showed that
only a very small fraction of users could correctly associate
privacy risks with the respective permissions [9]. One potential
root cause for this lack of understanding seems to be that
permissions communicate resource access, but do not explain
how accessed data is processed and distributed [10]. Hence,
users tend to underestimate the risks ("the app will not misuse
its permissions") or overestimate the risks ("the app will steal
all my private information") [9]. A lack of user comprehension
of permissions allows attackers to create malicious apps that
request all necessary sensitive permissions for their operations
(as demonstrated, e.g., by the Geinimi Trojan [90]).
Apps published after Android v6.0 may request a small
subset of privacy-related permissions during runtime instead
of at installation. Requesting permissions dynamically when
they are required by the app should provide users with more
contextual information and help them in their decision making
process. However, Wijesekera et al. [64] have shown that this
desired contextual integrity—i.e., personal information is only
used in ways determined appropriate by the users—is not
necessarily provided by dynamic permissions and runtime con-
sent dialogs: A majority of privacy-related permission requests
occur when the user is not interacting with the requesting
application or even with the phone, and, moreover, requests
occur at a frequency that prohibits involving the user in every
decision making process. As a consequence, users failed to
establish the connection between the permission request and
the apps’ functionality and consent dialogs are only shown
during first request to grant access until manually revoked by
the users although subsequent permission checks might occur
in a different privacy-context than the initial request.
b) Permission Comprehension and Attention by App De-
velopers: Android’s security design requires app developers
to contribute to platform security by requesting, defining, and
properly enforcing permissions in order to retrieve and protect
sensitive user data. Thus, even more than for end users, it is
imperative that app developers understand permissions and the
security tools at their disposal.
Permission Comprehension by App Developers. A number
of studies [12], [13], [14], [16], [17] give insight into how app
developers comprehend permissions and, in particular, how the
SDK supports them in their task to realize least-privileged
apps (e.g., considering the stability of the permission set
or the extent to which permission-protected APIs are well-
documented). Between 30% [13] and 44.8% [12] of the
studied apps requested unnecessary permissions, i.e., were
over-privileged and in clear violation of the least-privilege
principle. Moreover, several apps have been found that request
non-existent or even wrong permissions. Even developers of
system apps, who have access to the highest privileged and
highly dangerous API functions, did not exhibit a significantly
better understanding of permissions [15].
To understand the root causes behind the developers’ incom-
prehension of permissions, the studies analyzed the Android
API documentation, finding that the API is insufficiently
documented and does not identify all permission-protected
APIs. Even worse, the documentation also contained errors,
e.g., describing the wrong permission required for an API
function. Confusing permission names also contribute to these
misconceptions. These inconsistencies and the instability of
the API impede a clear and well-developed documentation
and thereby contribute to the developers’ incomprehension of
permissions and to confusion about permission usage.
Permission Attention by App Developers. Besides develop-
ers’ (lack of) comprehension of permissions, the thoughtful-
ness of developers when enforcing permissions was studied,
as well as their level of comprehension of the mechanisms
at their disposal to accomplish this task. Although Android’s
security design incorporates important lessons learned from
prior operating system security research [91], the fact that
it allows and even encourages differently privileged apps
to communicate with each other has piqued the security
research community’s interest in how this can be exploited
by unprivileged apps to escalate their privileges [17], [18],
[19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], [15]. In particular, various
works have identified an increase in failure of app developers
to properly protect their app’s IPC-exposed (or exported)
interfaces and to transitively enforce permissions [20]. This
9
opens the attack surface for confused deputy attacks2 to, e.g.,
initiate phone calls [17], hijack ICC [19], or exfiltrate sensitive
user data [23], [22]. The root cause of many of those identified
vulnerabilities is that application components were by default
exported to be IPC-callable and thus require that the devel-
opers either explicitly protect them with permissions or hide
the components. As indicated by the uncovered vulnerabilities,
most developers are unaware of these conditions. To phrase
this in the terms of Saltzer’s and Schroeder’s secure design
principles [91]: Android failed to implement fail-safe defaults.
2) Countermeasures: Recent changes [94] in the default
installer app for Google Play aim to improve permission
perception for users. Installers present permissions with low
granularity in groups, while some commonly requested per-
missions, like INTERNET, are not presented at all anymore.
This shift in permission presentation can be viewed as a
pure user experience decision, not as an enabler of user
comprehension.
Research has made several suggestions to enhance the
usability of permissions for both end users and developers:
Kelley et al. [59] propose to enrich permission dialogs with
more detailed privacy-related information to help users make a
more informed decision. Porter Felt et al. [95] propose making
the permission-granting mechanism dependent on the kind of
permission that is requested, e.g., auto-granting non-severe
permissions with reversible side-effects, trusted UI for user-
initiated or alterable requests, or confirmation dialogs for non-
alterable, app-initiated requests that need immediate approval.
A concrete realization of trusted UI are access control gadgets
by Roesner et al. [96] that allow a user-driven delegation of
permissions to apps whenever such widgets can be effectively
integrated into the apps’ workflows. Wijesekera et al. [64]
suggest more intelligent systems that learn about their users’
privacy preferences and only confront users with consent
dialogs when a permission request is unexpected for the user.
This consent dialog should provide sufficient contextual cues
for users, e.g., clearly indicating the app requesting the access
to protected resources as well as clearly communicating why
the resource is accessed. Liu et al. [97] propose eliminating
the burden of understanding the enormous list of permissions
by using a limited set of privacy profiles including certain
permissions instead; and Felt et al. [13] propose to improve
API documentation to simplify permission requests for app
developers.
Multiple system extensions have been suggested to enhance
the permission system: The seminal Kirin [17] OS extension
used combinations of permissions requested by an app to de-
tect potential misuse of permissions and also revealed confused
deputy apps on AOSP. Apex [55] introduced dynamic and con-
ditional permission enforcement to Android. TaintDroid [54]
used dynamic taint tracking to reveal for the first time how
apps actually use permission-protected data and uncovered
a number of questionable privacy practices that motivated
2The literature has yet to agree on a fixed term. Other works designate this
attack category as permission re-delegation [20], as component hijacking [22],
or as capability leaks [24], [92]. We use the term confused deputy [93].
enhancements to the permission system and access control
on ICC. Sorbet [21] was first to model Android permissions
and uncovered problems with desired security properties (like
controlled delegation of privileges) on Android.
Some system extensions specifically aim at mitigating con-
fused deputies: XManDroid [57] primarily augments the per-
mission enforcement with policy-driven access control, where
policies specify confused deputy and collusion attacks [18],
[98] states. QUIRE [56] establishes provenance information
along ICC call paths, enabling callees to evaluate their trust
in the caller. IPC inspection [20] reduces the privileges of
callees to the privileges of the caller.
WHYPER [61] and AutoCog [62] apply NLP techniques
to automatically derive the required permissions from app
descriptions, taking developers out of the loop, and check
whether described functionality and actually requested per-
missions correspond. DescribeMe [63] takes the opposite track
and generates security-centric app descriptions from analysis
of app code in order to increase user understanding of the app.
3) Actors’ Roles: Platform developers (A1. ) and market
operators (A3. ) are fully responsible for the permission
comprehension problems, as the platform enforces use of the
current permission system, and the platforms’ and the markets’
installers communicate the privacy risks of installing appli-
cations to users. Library providers (A4. ) contribute to this
problem through their permission requests. App developers
(A5. ) tend to over-privilege their apps (either for their own
needs, or on behalf of library providers their apps use), making
apps appear unnecessarily dangerous. End users (A8. ) tend to
pay little attention to permissions [9], and only have the option
of accepting everything or not installing the app at all.3 Thus,
while end users’ behavior eventually opens the door to misuse
by malware, end users have limited options and capabilities to
detect whether permissions are being misused.
This problem could potentially be fixed by platform devel-
opers (R1. ) by changing their access control paradigm and
avoiding conditions for some of the identified vulnerabilities
(e.g. failing to implement fail-safe defaults). Additionally, by
helping app developers (R5. ) and library providers (R4. )
in realizing security best practices for defensive programming
through tool support [13], [58] (R7. ), this indirectly helps
end users. App markets (R3. ) could make their permission
dialogs more comprehensive, demand justification from app
developers and run static analyses on received app packages
to adjust permissions accordingly.
4) Lesson Learned: In conventional ecosystems, neither
developers nor users were involved in the process of requesting
or granting fine-grained permissions to access resources on
a computer. Allowing developers to request and define fine-
grained permissions and presenting end users permission di-
alogs is a good idea in theory. However, research illustrates
that this approach overburdens both: Developers tend not
to focus their efforts on the selection process for permis-
3While this has changed with Android v6.0, developers nullify this change
by making their apps compatible with older Android versions.
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sions [13], while end users neither understand nor pay much
attention to Android’s permission dialogs [9], [99]. Research
has strived to improve permission dialogs [59], [64], [97], but
none of these approaches has solved the two-sided usability
and comprehension problem. Permission dialogs have issues
similar to warning messages: They fail to lead to the desired
effect, as users tend to click through them, misunderstand their
purpose, and hence do not benefit from them.
Instead of continuing the current line of research, we
propose a clean break and a shift towards taking both users and
developers out of the loop: Approaches that try to automati-
cally derive the required permissions for an app based on its
category, description, and similarity to other apps seem to take
a more promising track [61], [62], [63]. Another promising
alternative seems to be authorizing entire information flows
instead of only access to resources. Although not new [100],
[101], this idea seems worth being re-investigated for appified
platforms that put the burden of granting permissions onto
their end users.
Our assessment (Permission Evolution): The decision
to realize permissions as implemented by Android was
understandable at Android’s launch, but the concept has
failed in practice, and was presumably doomed to fail
from the beginning.
B. Permission Revolution
A dedicated line of research has investigated the possibilities
of extending alternative access-control models to the Android
platform to establish more flexible, fine-grained, and manda-
tory control over system resources and ICC. This research
followed two major directions: OS extensions and Inlined
Reference Monitoring (IRM).
1) Challenges:
a) Missing Privilege Separation: The most common
third-party code distributed with apps is analytic and adver-
tisement libraries that display ads in order to monetize the app
(cf. Section III-A) [29]. More than 100 unique ad libraries are
available for the different ad networks included in more than
half of all apps [25], [26], [27], [28], [29].
The host app and third-party libraries engage in a symbiotic
relationship that currently requires mutual trust. Libraries
execute in the context of their host app’s sandbox and inherit
all privileges of their host app. However, ad libraries tend
to exploit these privileges and exhibit a variety of dangerous
behaviors, including misconduct such as insecure loading of
code from web sources [30] as well as collecting users’
private information [26]. Inversely, developers of host apps
have a strong interest in monetizing their apps. Fraudulent
app developers can exploit the symbiotic relationship [31] to
surreptitiously steal money from the ad network by faking
click events [31]. Android’s design failed to provide privilege
separation between these two principals [91], worsening the
privacy threat of ad libraries to users’ data in comparison to
conventional browser-based ads [28].
b) Ineffective Security Apps: Android follows the mantra
that "all applications are created equal" [102]. However, this
also implies that apps by external security vendors, such as
anti-virus apps, do not have higher privileges than other apps.
Studies have investigated to what extent this philosophy influ-
ences the efficacy of such security apps [2], [32], [33]. Prior
systematization of existing Android malware has evaluated
the effectiveness of existing anti-virus apps for Android and
reported that detection rates vary from 54.7%-79.6% [2], [33],
[32]. One study [33] suggests that platform support for anti-
virus apps is essential to improve their efficacy.
c) Lack of Support for Mandatory Access Control:
Mobile devices are often used in fields with strong security re-
quirements, such as enterprises and government sectors. Con-
ventional operating systems in those contexts apply advanced
access control models that protect more sensitive information
(e.g., non-interference between two distinct security levels).
The support for mandatory access control is a cornerstone of
the platform security of such established systems. Conversely,
Android lacks any support for mandatory access control.
While the requirement of supporting advanced access con-
trol schemes is intuitive and plausibe, we are not aware of
any academic security requirements analysis that focuses on
those particular stakeholders (i.e., enterprise and government
sectors) on mobile devices and that could describe the particu-
lar challenges that come with enabling support for such access
control schemes on mobile devices. Only governmental guide-
lines have been published, e.g., by NIST [103]. Consequently,
academic research has explored the particular challenges of
adding mandatory and alternative access control models to
Android from different angles, not all of which directly relate
to high-security deployment.
2) Countermeasures: To provide advanced access control
models and robust defenses against malware on Android,
research has followed two main directions for adding access
control to Android based on the responsible deployment actor.
a) Alternative Access Control Models: Early work [65],
[66], [67] explored how access control within Android’s appli-
cation framework can be more semantically rich and dynamic
and introduced mechanisms that have since been adopted by
several follow-up works. The seminal Saint [65] architecture
allows app developers to define policy-based restrictions and
conditions on ICC to and from their app. CRePE [66] ex-
tended Android with context-related access control for system
resources, where context is defined as the device state and
senseable environment. TISSA [67] introduced access control
mechanisms for fine-grained data sharing, such as returning
filtered, fake, or empty data from calls to framework APIs.
More recently, the SE Android [68] project solved the tech-
nically complex challenge of porting SELinux-based manda-
tory access control from the desktop domain to Android. While
SE Android focused on the Android OS, FlaskDroid [70]
demonstrated how SELinux’ type enforcement can be ex-
tended into the userspace components of the Android applica-
tion framework and benefit privacy protection.
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Prior work specifically addressed the lack of privilege sep-
aration between the different security principals on Android.
AdDroid [27] and AdSplit [73] both propose separating adver-
tisement code into separate processes. LayerCake [74] inves-
tigated the more general problem of secure cross-application
interface embedding on Android, e.g., integrating ad libraries
or social network plugins into the host app’s UI while miti-
gating common threats such as click fraud, overlays, or focus
stealing. Compac [72] demonstrates the applicability of stack
inspection in conjunction with ICC tagging to establish per-
component access control for Android apps.
b) Inlined Reference Monitoring: A parallel line of
work [75], [76], [77], [78] has investigated inline reference
monitoring [104] for enforcing more fine-grained and dynamic
access control policies for privacy protection. These works
were mainly motivated by the deployability benefits of binary
rewriting as a foundation for IRM in contrast to OS modi-
fications, which empower end users to enhance their privacy
independently from platform developers and device vendors.
IRM solutions on Android currently make the inherent
tradeoff of abandoning a strong security boundary between
untrusted code and reference monitor, and hence their attacker
model focuses on curious-but-benign applications rather than
on malicious code. Moreover, modifying third-party code
involves legal considerations. Most recent advances in this
field [79] introduce application virtualization techniques to
Android to avoid third-party code modifications and separate
the reference monitor from untrusted code.
3) Actors’ Roles: The platform developers are able (A1. ,
R1. and R2. ) to integrate more advanced access control
models, to offer better privilege separation between third party
security principals, and to provide means to integrate external
security apps. The lack of support for third-party security
apps is particularly noticeable for the platform developer actor,
since Android’s security philosophy shifts responsibility for
privacy protection to end users by forcing them to grant/deny
permission requests and by allowing them to load applications
from arbitrary sources (i.e. to bypass controlled distribution
channels like markets). Furthermore, the problem of missing
privilege separation could also be alleviated by ad network
providers (A4. , R4. ) by refraining from clearly unacceptable
behavior and by implementing security best practices.
Binary rewriting solutions for IRM currently need to be
deployed by end users (R8. ), who also need to configure
policies. Their technical approach would also allow software
distribution channels or toolchain providers to implement IRM
solutions for apps they distribute/create (R2. and R7. ).
4) Lesson Learned: Android adopted design principles
from earlier high-assurance systems, and research has pro-
posed valuable access control extensions to their implementa-
tions on Android. Although most of the proposed OS exten-
sions are not based on a concrete requirements analysis but
rather on postulated challenges, the recent developments of
Google’s AOSP have a posteriori validated this research; and,
in fact, research results can be found in current real-world
deployments within the bounds imposed by Google’s business
model (for instance, SELinux MAC & KNOX [105], dynamic
permissions, AppOps, VPN apps, after-market ROMs). Re-
search ideas for privilege separation within app sandboxes, in
contrast, should be pushed to maturity and have to be brought
to the attention of platform developers. Like mash websites
that combine various security principals that are now privilege
separated by the browser’s sandboxing mechanims, mobile
apps that mash various security principals require an adequate
privilege separation. IRM solutions are an interim idea, but do
not take the user out of the loop (see Section IV-B) and are
limited in their security guarantees.
Since access control enforcement on Android has been
well studied, the research community should shift focus to
the canonical challenges of policy generation and verification.
Almost no attention has been given to developing useful and
real policies. Drawing from experience on desktop systems,
policies are moving targets that require decades to develop;
research for mobile systems should support this process. In
particular, Android’s strong requirement for sharing func-
tionality between apps and the shift to privacy protection
are unexplored for global policies. Moreover, at the moment
enforcement mechanisms on Android are implemented as best-
effort, and the history of OS security has shown the need for
verifying complex enforcement mechanisms and their policies.
Our assessment (Permission Revolution): Retrofitting
Android with mandatory access control has created valu-
able ideas that influenced real-world deployments. Better
privilege separation of apps should be pushed to maturity.
The research community should now refocus on open
challenges for policy generation and system verification.
C. Webification
An ongoing trend for mobile apps is webification, the inte-
gration of web content into mobile apps through technologies
like WebView. Seamless integration of apps with HTML and
JavaScript content provides portability advantages for app
developers. Through its APIs, WebView allows apps a rich,
two-way interaction with the hosted web content: Apps can
invoke JavaScript within the web page, and also monitor and
intercept events in the page as well as register interfaces that
web content can invoke to use app-local content outside the
WebView sandbox. By now, mobile web apps make up 85%
of the free apps on Play [39], [37].
1) Challenges: The webification of apps raises new security
challenges that are unique to appified mobile platforms.
Foremost, the two-way interaction between a host app and
its embedded web content requires app developers to relax the
WebView sandboxing. This enables app-to-web and web-to-
app attacks [39], [37], [34]. In app-to-web attacks, malicious
apps can inject JavaScript into hosted WebViews to extract
sensitive user information and use the WebView APIs to
navigate the WebView to untrusted websites. In web-to-app
attacks, untrusted web content (possibly also injected into an
insecure HTTP/S connection [39]) can leverage the JavaScript
bridge to the host app to escalate its privileges to the level
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of its hosting app’s process to access local system resources.
In particular, popular web app creator frameworks, such as
PhoneGap, open a large attack surface for those kind of attacks
through their large web-to-app and app-to-web interfaces. [34]
Further,it has been shown [35], [39] that data flows between
apps that host different web origins can cross domains through
the default Android ICC channels, enabling cross-site scripting
and request forgery attacks by malicious apps or untrusted
web content within an app. Specifically on mobile platforms,
various means enable code to be injected into web content and
cross-site scripting attacks to be conducted [38].
2) Countermeasures: To solve the new security challenges
raised by webification, different defense strategies have been
proposed: NoFrak [34] extends the PhoneGap framework with
capability-based access control for web origins to restrict
access by web content to the functionality of the JavaScript
bridge. Along the same lines, NoInjection [38] adds saniti-
zation to the bridge of PhoneGap to prevent code injections.
Morbs [35] proposes an extension to the Android application
framework to attach origin information on ICC channels that
can cross origin between apps, thus enabling apps to apply a
same-origin policy and prevent the reported cross site scripting
and request forgery attacks. Additionally, different modifica-
tions to the Android WebView and Android IDEs have been
discussed [35], [39], such as supporting whitelisting of web
origins that have access to the JavaScript bridge; displaying
the security of WebView connections to the end user; or lint
tools to warn app developers about insecure TLS certificate
validation in WebViews.
3) Actors’ Roles: Fundamentally, platform developers are
required to integrate better isolation of web origins in Web-
Views and support origin-based access control on data flows
(R1. ). Additionally, providers of web app frameworks and
app publishers are responsible for securing their web-to-app
and app-to-web bridges (R4. and R6. ).
4) Lesson Learned: The trend towards web apps and usage
of web technologies lowered the hurdle for writing apps even
more. However, some of the same mistakes known from web
applications in browsers were replicated and new problems
arose. Cross-origin and web-to-app/app-to-web vulnerabilities
constitute serious security challenges for the move towards
web apps. However, since such issues are fixable by platform
developers and do not require tens of thousands of developers
or millions of end users to adopt new security mechanisms,
we think this trend is worth pushing in the future.
Our assessment (Webification): Using standard web
technology for building apps has proven satisfactory, if
somewhat initially shaky. After well-known web security
issues have been fixed and integrated with the platform’s
app sandboxing, this trend should continue.
D. Programming-induced Leaks
This section deals with challenges and countermeasures
regarding data leaks caused by developer errors for apps,
frameworks, and libraries.
1) Challenges: Android provides a comprehensive set of
APIs for app developers. A fraction of these APIs are security-
related and provide interfaces for Android’s permission sys-
tem, secure network protocols and cryptographic primitives.
Prior work has investigated the quality of security-related API
implementations: Fahl et al. [40] investigated security issues
with customized TLS certificate validation implementations in
Android apps and found widespread, serious problems with
how developers used TLS. In follow-up work, they conducted
developer interviews to learn the root causes of misusing
Android’s integrated TLS API and found that the current API
is too complex for many developers [42]. Although Android
provides safe defaults, in ≈95% of the cases app developers
decided to implement customized certificate validation mech-
anisms, the result being an active MITMA vulnerability.
An analysis on the programming quality of cryptographic
primitives such as block ciphers and message authentication
codes in Android apps by Egele et al. [43] found that 88% of
the analyzed apps made at least one mistake when using those
primitives. The authors came to the conclusion that Android’s
default configuration for cryptographic primitives is not safe
enough and that the API documentation in this area is poor.
It was also found that apps load code via insecure channels
(e.g., http) without verification of the loaded code [30]. Of
the hereby analyzed apps, 9.25% are vulnerable to insecure
code loading, meaning attackers can inject malicious code into
benign apps and turn them into malware. The authors came to
the conclusion that this is an API issue, since Android’s API
does not provide secure remote code loading.
2) Countermeasures: MalloDroid [40] is a static analysis
tool to detect broken TLS certificate validation implementa-
tions in Android apps. Fahl et al. [42] propose a redesign
of Android’s middleware/SDK to prevent developers from
willfully or accidentally breaking TLS certificate validation.
SMV-Hunter [41] is a similar approach, additionally applying
dynamic code analysis techniques. CryptoLint [43] is a static
analysis tool to detect misuse of cryptographic APIs on
Android. CHEX [22] is a static analysis tool to automatically
detect component hijacking vulnerabilities. ScanDroid [80] is
a modular data flow analysis tool for apps, which tracks data
flows through and across components. AndroidLeaks [81] is
a large-scale analysis tool to detect privacy leaks in apps
with the intention to reduce the overhead for manual security
audits. FlowDroid [82] applies static taint analysis techniques
to detect (un-)intentional privacy leaks in Android apps.
3) Actors’ Roles: Apps that misuse the above security
related APIs leave their apps vulnerable to other apps installed
on the device (C2. ), to malicious dynamic code loading
(C5. ) or network attacks (C6. ).
A common conclusion of the above API misuse studies
is that Android’s API design does not provide safe defaults
(A1. ) in many cases [43]) and when it does, these defaults
often do not match the average developer’s needs [42] (A4. ,
A5. ). A study to identify the root causes of these issues
conducted with Android developers [42] suggests a redesign
of existing security related APIs with the developer’s needs
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in mind (R1. ). Better toolchain support to support secure
API usage (R7. ) could help the developers of apps (R5. )
and library providers (R4. ) to write more secure code. App
markets (R3. ) could run analyses on apps to prevent insecure
apps from being installed on end users’ devices.
4) Lesson Learned: Previous research uncovered numerous
programming issues. A high number of (new) developers code
(mobile/web) apps, and security APIs seem to pose a severe
challenge for many of them. Developer interviews illustrated
that many inexperienced developers write (mobile/web) apps
and struggle to provide the basic functionality, which leaves
no room for security and privacy considerations. Many of the
provided security APIs allow for very detailed configurations,
which seem to overwhelm the average developer and result
in insecure/improper selection of security options. Developers
are on the front line of the security battle and many of them
are currently overburdened. However, user studies with de-
velopers [42] illustrate that platform developers could modify
the current API design to achieve better security by making
APIs more developer-friendly. We argue that it should become
common practice to use developer studies to test and improve
security and privacy APIs.
Our assessment (Programming-induced Leaks): Ex-
isting work on redesigning and simplifying usage of
APIs and security-related tools should be extended and
complemented by research on currently unexplored areas
of developer usability.
E. Software Distribution
Software distribution in the appified world has changed from
a decentralized to a centralized model.
1) Challenges: Android’s ecosystem has piqued the interest
into investigating the impact of its software distribution chan-
nels for the protection of end users against malicious apps. A
second challenge is the protection of app developers against
common problems such as piracy.
a) App Piracy and Malware Incentives: Pioneering work
investigated the incentives of malware developers and the state
of malware for modern smartphone operating systems like
iOS and Android [46]. The authors discovered that the most
common malware activities were collecting user information
and sending premium-rate SMS messages. This work predicted
that in the future, with proliferation of the app markets and
advertisement networks for mobile platforms, ad fraud will
be a major incentive for malware authors. This prediction
has been proven accurate by different follow-up studies [47],
[32], [48], [49], [50], [29]. With the exception of a dedicated
malware detection analysis [32], these studies focused on re-
packaged (also noted as cloned [49], [50] or piggybacked [48])
apps, which have been identified as a major malware distri-
bution method. The common bottom-line of all works (except
one [32]) is that markets contain a noticeable number of re-
packaged apps. Although all studies found trojan-like malware
in the markets, the vast majority of re-packaged apps have been
modified to siphon ad revenue from the original app authors
(e.g., by exchanging the ad lib or ad identifier), thus suggesting
that plagiarists of apps are fiscally motivated. Hence, this
majority of re-packaged apps is not strictly malware in the
sense that they harm the end user, but instead financially harm
the affected app developers [50].
The implication of this research is that besides the known
open challenge of protecting end users from malware dis-
tributed over markets, another pressing issue is the protection
of app developers against plagiarism. Both are important
factors in maintaining a healthy appified ecosystem, which
needs to be achieved primarily by app markets. A particular
challenge towards this goal is that plagiarism not only occurs
within a market, but also across markets. To fight plagiarism,
some alternative markets like Amazon’s App Store require
the app developers to participate in their DRM solutions—
with limited success [106]. Moreover, the technical enabler
for re-packaging apps has to be considered: Android apps
are signed by their developers and the signature is used to
verify install-time integrity of the installation package and to
implement a same-origin update policy. Thus, app developer
certificates can be (and are, by default) self-signed certificates
whose signature of app packages can be simply replaced with
a new signature. This allows re-packaging of apps with a low
technical knowledge and effort.
b) Application Signing Issues: Recent work [7] brought
up the central role of app markets in appified ecosystems as a
new threat for their users. Due to their central role and power
when distributing apps, app markets have enormous potential
to cheat on their users by withholding apps or updates. A
central security mechanism for software distribution is the
prior mentioned app signing with self-signed certificates. In-
vestigations [11], [7], [84] illustrate that the way app develop-
ers and publishers handle the current app signing mechanism
undermines the mechanism’s intention: Many developers and
publishers use one single key to sign up to 25,000 apps.
Without having effective revocation mechanisms at hand, such
practices are a serious threat to Android users. For instance,
Android allows developers to define permissions that are only
available to apps with the same origin (i.e., signing key) in
order to establish secure ICC. This same-origin assumption
(and with it secure ICC) is defeated by these inappropriate
app certification practices.
2) Countermeasures: Different market-enabled solutions
have been proposed to address the malware problem: Me-
teor [83] addresses security issues arising from multi-market
environments by providing the same security semantics as
for single-markets (e.g. kill switches and developer name
consistency). MAST [84] ranks apps based on their attributes
and helps targeting scarce malware analysis resources to apps
with highest potential of being malicious. Application Trans-
parency [7] addresses Android’s application signing issues. It
introduces different kinds of cryptographic proofs that allow
users to verify the authenticity of apps offered on app markets.
Naturally, different analysis methods evolved to identify
malware: DNADroid [49] is an approach to detect pirated
apps in markets by applying program dependency graphs
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for methods in candidate apps. RiskRanker [85] proposes a
proactive zero-day malware detection. CHABADA [86] takes a
different approach from the prior malware detection tools by
relying on anomaly detection: by grouping apps from same
categories (e.g., games) by their protected API usage patterns,
malicious apps stick out as outliers from those sets.
Ernst et al. [87] divert from the adversarial trust assumptions
between app vendor and market operator in prior works by
relying on a collaborative verification. Assuming that benign
developers will co-operate by annotating their code such that
it can be effectively verified, while malicious apps can be
reliably rejected, this could enable high-assurance app stores.
AppInk [89] aims at deterring app repackaging through
dynamic watermarking of apps. Through an IDE extension,
app developers can encode watermarks as triggerable code in
their app that can be checked dynamically by a companion
app to confirm authorship.
3) Actors’ Roles: Platform developers (A1. , R1. ) are
responsible for fixing key signing issues and allowing for
secure distribution of apps in the ecosystem, for instance,
distribution of encrypted application packages and full support
for PKIs. Additionally, end users (R8. ) could run malware
detection software on their devices. However, this would
require more effective support for malware detection from the
platform developers (see Section IV-B).
App markets (A3. , R3. ) with their central role in the soft-
ware distribution process have an enormous impact on security.
To prove their correct operations, they can add accountability
features [7]. However, also app developers (A5. , R5. ) and
publishers (A6. , R6. ) bear full responsibility for misusing
app signing recommendations and have the potential to fix
these issues in the future.
4) Lesson Learned: Appification has created an interesting
paradigm shift here. Software distribution and installation have
become highly centralized. Users typically go to a single app
market to search for and install their apps. With their central
role in the appified ecosystem, app markets’ impact on overall
security is enormous. They serve as a line of defense in the
fight against malware and could also implement one or more
of the many proposed app vetting technologies to protect their
users against buggy apps. On the other hand, app markets can
also serve as powerful attackers against their own users. They
can act as malware distributors or withhold apps or updates.
Although app markets are in a very powerful position, not
many of the security and privacy mechanisms proposed by
researchers have been adopted by app markets as of today.
However, when it comes to privacy, it is potentially not in
the best interest of an app market to protect its users. App
markets’ major motive is monetization by selling apps to their
users. As was shown in our systematization, particularly the
solutions proposed by researchers to improve users’ awareness
and control of privacy issues often would require the app
markets’ cooperation. However, less installs and less lucrative
advertising potential could potentially harm app markets’
interests. Thus, one result of our work is that researchers
should look for additional actors in the ecosystem that could
assist in improving users privacy. In particular, app publishers
and generators as a strongly emerging pattern for software
distribution [7] have not yet received any attention, although
their influence on the ecosystem can be considerable. It is
unclear to which extent publishers and app generators are
trustworthy or are harming the security of apps (e.g., following
security best practices) and the privacy of users (e.g., adding
tracking code).
Our assessment (Software Distribution): Centralizing
software distribution has proven successful for protecting
end users against malicious software and for fighting
piracy, and should be retained. The threat of malicious
app markets is manageable, with countermeasures (al-
most) ready to be deployed for market-scale application
sets. Trustworthiness of app publishers and generators as
emerging actors has to be evaluated and established.
F. Vendor Customization/Fragmentation
Fragmentation in appified ecosystems is a wide spread phe-
nomenon since many hardware and software vendors compete
for the customer base in the ecosystem.
1) Challenges: The Android ecosystem is fragmented at
two different levels: First, Android devices are shipped with
different OS versions customized by different vendors. Second,
vendors ship their devices with custom system apps. Different
works investigated the impact of vendor customizations on the
permission enforcement on Android [24], [15], [51], [52], [53]
that led to a large number of overprivileged system apps [15].
Moreover, vendor customization significantly increases the
phone’s attack surface. Vendors introduce higher-privileged
apps that act as confused deputies [52] or misconfigurations
at framework layer [53], both of which allow unprivileged
apps access to protected functionality. Recently, the impact
of vendor customizations of the device drivers [107] has
been investigated and the study reports very similar results:
customizations of Android to fit the vendor-specific hardware
have significantly increased the attack surface of the platform
and provided attackers access to highly sensible functionality.
2) Countermeasures: As of today no research has been
conducted to investigate countermeasures to challenges that
stem from fragmented appified ecosystems.
3) Actors’ Roles: Vendor customizations, and thus device
vendors, are responsible for the security degradations caused
by fragmentation and customization (A2. , R2. ).
4) Lesson Learned: Android’s open ecosystem, in contrast
to tighter controlled ecosystems like Apple’s iOS, allows
vendor customization and fosters the fragmentation that comes
along with such customizations. Hence, Android’s ecosystem
illustrates the potential security risks that such an open ap-
proach can induce and should be a warning to concurrent or
future appified platforms.
Another lesson to be learned from Android is encouraging
vendors to use (system) apps instead of OS patches to provide
custom hardware support and force Android to become more
modular. Forcing vendors to patch the OS was mainly driven
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by having only two different privilege levels for apps: system
and third party. Eliminating the need for OS patches and
allowing vendors to define more privilege levels to integrate
customization purely at user space level could reduce frag-
mentation and drastically reduce the attack surface caused by
OS modifications. Although prior works found that vendor app
developers make the same mistakes as third-party developers,
e.g., over-requesting permissions, bugs in more privileged
vendor apps could be more efficiently fixed via the standard
app update mechanism in contrast to OS updates. Since vendor
app and third party app developers presumably make the same
classes of errors, efforts to fix those error classes could be
focused instead of having to fight two challenges—apps and
OS patches.
Our assessment (Vendor Customization/Fragmenta-
tion): Allowing different vendors to customize their
devices fueled the adoption process of Android as an
appification platform. However, customizing the OS core
raised new challenges for platform developers and device
vendors. Hence, future fragmentation should focus on
system apps rather than OS patches.
G. Software Update Mechanism
Due to centralization of software distribution, app updates
are straight forward and can be pushed to millions of users si-
multaneously. However, fragmentation of the ecosystem makes
OS updates very challenging.
1) Challenges: Application life-cycles are very fast paced
and updates for actively maintained apps are published in
high frequency to markets [29] from where automated update
mechanisms distribute them to end users. This is even pushed
forward with centralizing updates of security critical libraries
such as WebView. In contrast, the situation at OS and appli-
cation framework level is rather bleak. Thomas et al. [108]
present a field study of 20,400 Android devices to measure
the prevalence of Android platform specific bugs in the wild.
They define a metric to rank the performance of device
manufacturers and network operators, based on their provision
of updates and exposure to critical vulnerabilities. Their central
finding is a significant variability in the timely delivery of
security updates across different device manufacturers and
network operators, since at least 87% of all investigated
devices were vulnerable to at least 11 different vulnerabilities.
In addition, the complexity of upgrading the Android OS
version induced problems in the permission management
across OS versions [51]. This attack class is currently unique to
permission-based mobile systems, such as Android, since the
attacker does not corrupt the current system or update image,
but instead strategically requests permissions and attributes
that are available on the future OS version.
2) Countermeasures: No research has thus far investigated
countermeasures for challenges that stem from software update
mechanisms as implemented on Android. Apart from research,
Google has with their latest Android versions changed their
update strategy for their Nexus devices [109], [110]. It remains
to be seen if other vendors adopt this strategy. Moreover,
the SecUp [51] app can detect apps that exploit the above
mentioned privilege-escalation attack through OS updates.
3) Actors’ Roles: Providing OS updates is responsibility
of device vendors (A2. , R2. ). Platform developers (A1. ,
R1. ) are responsible for introducing the upgrade privilege
escalation attack.
4) Lesson Learned: Many researchers expect the platform
developer to implement their countermeasures. However, even
if that should happen—which is rare, as of today devices
are not long-term and frequently maintained by vendors ex-
cept Google—this expectation is causing slow adaption of
new mechanisms and contributes to the fragmentation of
the ecosystem [5], [108]. This also opens a large window
of opportunity for attackers to compromise the system. In-
terestingly, appified platforms like Android already have a
modularization of software at the application layer. This is
inspired by classical high-assurance systems like EROS [111]
and in fact, the Binder IPC of Android establishes something
like a microkernel-like concept on top of the Linux kernel in
userspace. We would like to see this modularization extended
to allow modular updates of the system so that security updates
can be deployed faster to the end user without requiring a full
system update. This is an area where appified platforms are
way behind traditional operating systems.
Our assessment (Software Update Mechanism): Since
most proposed countermeasures rely on OS updates, and
OS fragmentation make these very cumbersome, the plat-
form developers should create better update mechanisms,
so that security fixes and countermeasures can be more
easily deployed.
V. CONCLUSION
The central conclusion we draw from this systematization
is that, like many new technologies, Android is a story of both
victory and defeat. New security mechanisms were introduced
without a clear understanding of how these applications would
be developed and used, and well-established security mecha-
nisms were re-used to meet the expected security needs of the
new general purpose computing platform. Some of the these
techniques were a great success, while others failed almost
entirely. We draw the following meta-conclusion:
Our meta-assessment: Some aspects worked out beau-
tifully, e.g., centralizing software distribution helps to
tackle critical security issues and makes fighting piracy
and malware easier. Other approaches had initial difficul-
ties, but are now more or less on track after research has
helped to identify and bridge them. Examples comprise
easier-to-use APIs that have started to replace hard-to-use
but well-intended security APIs over the last few years, as
well as the concept of Webification that has enabled more
developers to produce their own apps. However, some
approaches should be re-thought from the beginning and
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arguably abandoned for designs of future OSes: Permis-
sion dialogs for end users should be removed entirely,
since they failed for the same reasons warning messages
have failed since the dawn of computing.
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